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Abstract  
This paper traces convergences in terms of flexibility and security with a focus on younger and older 
youth in European countries. Youth were one of the groups hardest hit by the economic crisis. Young 
people in most European countries are more likely to work on temporary contracts of limited duration 
than adults. In a majority of EU countries youth are also disadvantaged with regard to unemployment 
benefits. Eligibility criteria require a certain minimum period in employment before unemployment 
insurance benefits can be accessed; and means-testing applies to unemployment and social 
assistance benefit schemes.  
This paper adopts a comparative European approach in order to shed light on the interaction between 
flexibility and income security, for youth. Special extracts of the aggregate European Labour Force 
Survey data are used to trace the development of (involuntary) temporary employment among youth 
and access by youth to unemployment benefits as well as participation in short-time working. This is 
complemented by an institutional analysis charting changes in unemployment benefit criteria during 
the crisis.  
To frame this analysis, we employ a more dynamic version of the flexicurity matrix (Wilthagen and 
Tros 2004). The paper analyses trade-offs, vicious and virtuous relationships between external and 
internal numerical flexibility as well as income security (Leschke, Schmid, Griga 2007; Schmid 2009) 
among youth and thereby tackles a combination of dimensions of flexibility and security so far 
underexplored. This allows us to assess if developments during the economic crisis have improved or 
rather deteriorated the situation of youth with regard to different dimension of flexibility and security. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper traces the interface between flexibility and security with a focus on younger and older 
youth in European countries. To begin with some context on aspects of the flexibility- security 
interface, young people in most European countries are more likely to work on temporary contracts 
(external numerical flexibility) than adults. Temporary contracts are by definition of limited duration 
whereas due to strict employment protection legislation permanent workers are often difficult to fire. 
Youth are therefore disproportionally hit by unemployment and this was particularly evident during the 
economic crisis. At the same time, they are, in the majority of countries, disadvantaged with regard to 
unemployment benefit receipt (income security). Adequate unemployment benefit coverage not only 
renders youth more independent from their parents but it has also been shown to lead to better post-
unemployment outcomes including earnings and job stability (e.g. Gangl 2004). Access to 
unemployment insurance benefits usually requires a certain period in employment within a specific 
reference period; unemployment assistance and social assistance are frequently means-tested on the 
household. In both of these aspects, youth can be disadvantaged by comparison to adults. Turning to 
short-term working, due to (on average) lower tenure and work experience, an important asset when 
employers decide about whom to keep and whom to fire, it is likely that young people did not benefit 
as much as adults from short-time working measures – reduced working time with partial income 
replacement (internal numerical flexibility) – which were popular measures in several countries during 
the economic crisis (Arpaia et al. 2010). Youth thus seem to be disadvantaged on both dimensions of 
the flexibility-security interface. 
 
Particularly in the first years of the crisis, serious efforts were made in several countries to improve 
the income security of those groups disproportionally hit by unemployment, among them in particular 
youth and temporary workers. These efforts focused both on employment (opening up of state-
subsidized short-term working schemes to new groups) and on unemployment (more inclusive 
unemployment benefits). There was also a focus on income security of non-standard workers and 
youth at the European and international level as various publications testify (e.g. OECD 2010, EEOR 
2011). Moreover, a Euro-area wide basic unemployment insurance, which could serve as an 
automatic stabilizer in downturns, has been discussed (Dullien 2013; del Monte and Zandstra 2014), 
though such a scheme would not automatically cover all unemployed workers. The subsequent 
austerity measures were, by contrast, often geared towards employment and social policies (e.g. 
Heise and Lierse 2011; Lehndorff 2014), with likely impacts also on these initial expansionary 
adjustments to unemployment benefits in some countries.  
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Against this background, this paper adopts a comparative European approach. It traces 
developments on the interface between external and internal numerical flexibility and income security 
for youth during different phases of the economic crisis. Section 2 frames this paper, presenting a 
more dynamic version of the flexicurity matrix (Wilthagen and Tros 2004). It thereby adopts a critical 
stance towards flexicurity, drawing out not only trade-offs but also virtuous and vicious relationships 
between flexibility and security (Leschke, Schmid, Griga 2007; Schmid 2009). Section 3 briefly 
discusses the developments in external and internal flexibility for youth during different phases of the 
economic crisis. Section 4, the core of this paper, then turns to income security in unemployment, a 
dimension of the flexibility-security matrix so far underexplored. In a first subsection we map the 
institutional changes occurring in the design of unemployment benefits in a number of European 
countries during the crisis with the intention to make benefits more inclusive for youth and other 
labour market groups particularly affected by the economic crisis. This section is complemented by an 
analysis of benefit coverage of young and older youth as compared to adults based on special 
extracts of aggregate European Labour Force Survey data. The paper concludes with a discussion of 
the results in light of the extended flexibility-security matrix. 
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2. Trade-offs, virtuous and vicious 
relationships between external and 
internal flexibility and income security 
 
There has been a long-standing criticism of the flexicurity concept as proposed by the European 
Commission (e.g. European Commission 2007), notably on the strong emphasis on external 
numerical flexibility as opposed to job and income security during the second half of the Lisbon 
Strategy (e.g. Burroni and Keune 2011; Tangian 2009). The European Trade Union Confederation 
has repeatedly criticised the shift from job security granted by strict employment protection legislation 
to employability security, to be achieved for example by active labour market policies and life-long 
learning measures. The economic crisis has put the flexicurity concept further under pressure (Heyes 
2011; Lyne Ibsen 2011) and – in view of the youth unemployment crisis and the fact that workers with 
temporary contracts were disproportionally affected – also put a question mark on the previous strong 
focus on flexibility rather than cushioning security. All too often have flexibility and security been 
treated as trade-offs or compromises between employers and workers with flexibility mostly catering 
to employers and security to workers. In view of the criticism and in particular the crisis experience, 
the European Commission with their Europe 2020 strategy, in place since 2010, has somewhat 
modified its take on flexicurity. In the Europe 2020 strategy it puts more emphasise on the role of job 
security for those countries that have very segmented labour markets1 and draws out the importance 
of income security at transitions. More adequate social security benefits for some groups of non-
standard workers are specifically mentioned in the integrated guidelines on economic and 
employment policies (Council of the European Union 2010, guideline 7). Also the positive role in 
buffering employment shocks of internal flexibility devices such as short-time working measures and 
working time accounts are emphasised in the Commissions agenda on new skills and jobs (European 
Commission 23.11.2010).  
 
A critical use of the flexicurity concept is particularly important with regard to youth who tend to 
accumulate negative flexicurity outcomes which the crisis has further emphasised (Madsen et al. 
2013). They are more prone than adults to hold a temporary contract (see section 3) and at the same 
time, due to contracts of shorter duration and thereby greater difficulties of fulfilling the eligibility 
requirements for unemployment insurance benefits, their access to unemployment benefits is 
considerable lower than that of adults (see section 4). Thus, the flexibility-security nexus could be 
described as vicious (losing out on both dimensions as higher contractual flexibility means more 
frequent unemployment which is less often secured). As we show below the crisis has not only 
triggered a change in discourse at the EU and international level but also institutional change (though 
often only of a temporary nature) which made unemployment benefits initially more inclusive towards 
youth and temporary workers in a number of countries. In the second part of the crisis some of these 
developments have been taken back again or passive benefit receipt of youth has been linked more 
                                                
 
1 See for example the discussion on the single open-ended contract which however has been ardently criticised by the European 
Trade Union Confederation. 
2 Note however that due to differences in definition and delimitation of short-time work the EU LFS figures vary somewhat from other 
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strongly to education or training. Table 1 shows the different possibilities for combining the various 
dimensions of flexibility and security (for an extensive discussion of the different dimensions and 
illustrations of trade-offs, vicious and virtuous relationships refer to Leschke, Schmid and Griga 2007 
and Schmid 2009).  
 
Table 1: The flexibility-security nexus: trade-off (t), virtuous (vr) or vicious relationship (vc) 
 Security  
Flexibility 
Job 
Security 
Employment/ 
Employability 
Security 
Income  
Security 
Option  
Security 
External 
Numerical 
t t / vr / vc t / vr / vc t 
Internal Numerical vr vr (t) / vr t / vr 
Internal Functional vr vr t / vr (t) / vr 
External Functional vr t / vr / vc t / vr t / vr 
Source: Leschke, Schmid and Griga 2007, adapted from Wilthagen and Tros (2004). 
 
In our concluding section we will use these dimensions to assess the developments on the interface 
of external and internal numerical flexibility and income security for youth during the economic crisis. 
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3. Developments in external and internal 
numerical flexibility for youth during 
the crisis 
Labour market transitions are a common phenomenon among youth – the school-to-work transitions 
is often characterised by moves in and out of the labour market before a stable job is found (OECD 
2010). These transitions are due to first-time jobs that are rather unstable (e.g. temporary contracts 
for probationary periods) or by definition of shorter duration (e.g. training contracts). Some youth 
withdraw from the labour market for prolonged periods of time for example to return to education. 
Unemployment (and inactivity) is therefore a frequent phenomenon among young people and one 
which has increased manifold with the economic crisis. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates for the EU as a whole the disproportionate levels of unemployment and forms of 
non-standard employment (temporary employment and part-time work) experienced by youth.  Youth 
both started from higher levels (with the exception of part-time employment for the older youth group) 
than adults and were more affected by increases in unemployment and non-standard employment 
over the course of the crisis. Unemployment currently (2013) lies at 23.3% for the younger and 14.6% 
for the older youth group, this compares with 8.8% for adults. The spread is large across Europe with 
an unemployment rate of 58.3% for youth (15-24) in Greece and 7.8% in Germany. Temporary 
employment is the prime example for external numerical flexibility – here the share of young youth 
lies at 42% and for older youth at 21.7%, the adult share stands at 9%. Both youth groups have 
slightly higher temporary employment shares in 2013 than before the crisis (2007) whereas the adult 
temporary employment rate is still slightly below its 2007 level. Temporary employment rates vary 
strongly across Europe in line with how strictly they are regulated (OECD 2013). Also, employment 
protection legislation for permanent jobs has an impact on temporary employment rates. For example, 
in the UK, few temporary jobs are disposed of as there is a weak regulation of permanent jobs.  
 
Temporary employment is often involuntary (could not find a permanent job) and this is on average 
more pronounced around older youth and adults (around 55% and 65%) than younger youth (around 
33%) across the EU27. In the 15-24 age group, more than half of the respondents say they have a 
temporary job due to not being able to find a permanent one in most EU countries. Only in Austria, 
Germany and Denmark are the majority of temporary contracts of young youth due to training 
contracts (see also Eurofound 2013). 
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Figure 1: Development in unemployment and non-standard employment over the crisis period 
 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS data, special extracts. 
 
Working time accounts or short-time working measures also create flexibility for employers in times of 
slack demand. Both have been used during the economic crisis with a slightly stronger focus on 
short-time working, as many countries which already had these publicly funded schemes in place 
before the crisis almost all expanded the schemes to increase their reach, with some other countries 
(BG, CZ, HU, LT, LV, NL, PL, SI, SK) newly introducing these schemes temporarily during the crisis. 
Newly introduced schemes are usually less generous in terms of duration and benefits than already 
established ones; they have, however, usually a wider coverage of employees (Arpaia et al. 2010). 
Some countries have introduced temporary schemes during the crisis that cover specific types of 
firms or sectors, only (Greece for small and medium-sized enterprises already having introduced 
short-time working and Sweden for manufacturing (LABREF 2015). No schemes exist in Cyprus, 
Estonia, and Malta which implies that in those countries working time reductions usually go hand in 
hand with wage cuts of the same proportion (ibid). In contrast to temporary employment which often is 
involuntary, as shown above, short-time working measures carry advantages for employees as they 
have allowed the preservation of jobs and the avoidance of unemployment during the crisis (Hijzen 
and Martin 2012). Short-time working schemes partially compensate lost wages through the 
unemployment benefit fund – in some countries topped up by sector-level funds (e.g. Belgium) either 
directly or via the employer.  
 
In the past, short-time working measures were in many countries restricted to core workers either 
explicitly by way of requiring that temporary workers would have to be released first, or implicitly by 
way of offering participation in these schemes only to workers eligible for unemployment benefits. 
During the crisis however several of these countries (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, 
Luxembourg) deliberately opened their schemes – temporarily or permanent – to new groups of 
workers (for country details see Arpaia et al. 2010; European Commission 2010c). The available 
empirical evidence indicates however that the positive impacts were limited to permanent workers 
(Hijzen and Martin 2012; Hijzen and Venn 2011). 
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Figure 2 illustrates short-time working over the crisis for both youth and adults.  It displays, for the 
EU27 average, the share of people working fewer hours than usual during the interview reference 
week due to slack work for technical or economic reasons (main reason) as a share of total 
employment. In all years adults are more likely than youth to participate in short-time working 
measures. In line with the expansion of these schemes to new groups of workers and among them 
temporary employed, for all groups (and somewhat more pronounced for adults and older youth) 
participation peaked in 2009. Thereafter it has been falling again though still stands at a higher level 
in 2013 than before the crisis for all three groups.  
 
Figure 2: Development in short-time working* (with or without partial benefits) over the crisis period 
for youth and adults (% of total employment) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS data, special extracts. 
*Person worked less than usual due to slack work as share of overall employment. 
 
Figure 3 provides information for short-time working by country and age group for the peak year, 
2009. The EU LFS data carries the advantage that it is more comparable across countries – it does 
however not tell us anything about if short-time working is compensated by partial unemployment 
benefits.2 Using Arpaia (2010) we therefore group countries into those without compensation (/), 
those with longstanding and usually more generous schemes ($) and those with new temporary and 
usually less generous schemes (¤). Figure 3 illustrates that young youth (15-24) were considerably 
more likely to participate in short-time working measures during the peak year in Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Latvia, Malta, and Lithuania – though with large variation in overall participation across 
these countries. In Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece and Hungary the participation of young youth was 
slightly higher than that of adults.  
 
  
                                                
 
2 Note however that due to differences in definition and delimitation of short-time work the EU LFS figures vary somewhat from other 
available figures including OECD and national level data. 
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Figure 3: Short-time working* (with or without partial wage replacement) by age group and country, 
2009 (peak) (% of total employment)  
 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS data, special extracts. 
Note: data for Sweden and Luxembourg missing or incomplete. Countries are ordered by coverage of youth (15-24). 
*Person worked less than usual due to slack work as share of overall employment. 
$ Countries with longstanding short-time working schemes. 
¤Countries with newly introduced temporary short-time working schemes which are often less generous than in the countries where 
they have already been in place before the crisis. 
/Countries without publicly supported short-time working schemes (/) or publicly supported short-time working schemes only for 
selected sectors. 
 
Overall, in contrast to external numerical flexibility where youth are considerably over-represented – and 
particularly younger youth, internal numerical flexibility, as captured by short-time working here, is less 
segmented than initially expected.  It is younger rather than older youth who seem to have been over-
represented in short-time working. Note that a positive assessment of short-time working only holds as long 
as it has prevented even stronger increases in unemployment. Also, in countries or cases where no partial 
compensation of working hour reduction is available, short-time working will have adverse effects on the 
economic situation of affected workers. 
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4. Has income security at unemployment 
improved for youth during the 
economic crisis? 
Substantial shares of unemployed persons do not have access to unemployment insurance benefits. 
In part, this is deliberate policy (i.e. a link between contributions and benefits is intended), while in 
other cases it is unintended, as qualifying criteria for unemployment insurance are frequently based 
on “standard employment” (dependent, permanent and full-time) and are thus in many cases no 
longer in line with the changes in employment relationships (see e.g. OECD 2009a).  
 
Unemployment insurance benefits are the first tier of provision usually based on contributions by 
employers and employees. All European Union countries have unemployment insurance schemes 
though their eligibility conditions and benefit rates (generosity) differ substantially. If not eligible for 
unemployment insurance or if the entitlement is exhausted, the unemployed may be entitled to 
unemployment assistance which is typically less generous non-contributory, means tested at the 
household level, and financed by general taxation. The fact that it is assessed at the household level 
rather than the individual level implies that young people living at home have these broader 
household means taken into consideration as part of their assessment (Eurofound, 2013). Hours and 
earnings thresholds, as well as qualifying periods, are in most cases not of relevance for secondary 
benefit schemes. These secondary schemes exist in only eleven European countries (Eurofound, 
2013). New member states do not, for the most part, have unemployment assistance benefits. 
Unemployment assistance benefits are not always universal; for example, they are in some cases 
restricted to unemployed persons with families, youth or specific types of youth are in some cases 
explicitly excluded (compare OECD Benefits and Wages Indicators). In almost all European countries 
as a last minimum layer, tax funded social assistance subject to means testing exists. Table 2, 
provides figures on the generosity of unemployment insurance benefits and the existence of 
secondary unemployment benefit schemes. 
 
Table 2: Benefit generosity and existence of means-tested basic benefits – 2012  
Generosity Benefit Insurance net 
replacement rates for single 
earners at 67% at initial phase 
of unemployment. 
Secondary Benefit 
Assistance net 
replacement rates at 60 
months’ unemployment 
Secondary 
Benefit 
Assistance for 
Limited Groups 
Most generous 
(OECD, 2012) 
Switzerland, Portugal, Iceland, 
Netherlands, Bulgaria, Spain, 
Luxembourg, Denmark, 
Slovenia, Latvia, Belgium. 
Austria, Finland, France, 
Ireland, Malta, Portugal. 
Belgium*, 
Luxembourg, 
Sweden. 
Middle (OECD, 
2012) 
Romania, Ireland, Poland, 
Turkey, Estonia, Austria, 
Germany, Slovak Republic, 
Sweden, Hungary, Norway, 
France, Italy. 
Germany, Spain, United 
Kingdom. 
Spain, Poland. 
Least generous 
(OECD, 2012) 
United Kingdom, Greece, Malta. Estonia, Greece. Lithuania 
Source: OECD Benefits and Wages. Own compilation.  
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*Belgium has unemployment insurance benefits of unlimited duration. 
This section seeks to highlight the disadvantages suffered by youth in access to unemployment 
benefits, with special reference to changes during the first period of the crisis (2008-2009) and to 
developments throughout the austerity period (2010-2014). As unemployment benefit systems are 
designed to meet complex (and fast changing) conditions, there is no room here to refer to the 
detailed qualifying conditions and other design features, though some details are provided as they 
relate to youth (also as temporary workers).  Regularly updated comparative information on the 
design of unemployment benefits systems can be found in LABREF (2015), and the MISSOC 
comparative tables (2014). Detailed comparative information on unemployment benefit schemes, 
particularly with regard to part-time workers, is also available from a special OECD (2010b) survey. 
 
4.1 Review of disadvantages of youth with regard to 
unemployment benefits 
Young workers are subject to both explicit disadvantage in terms of differential rules of access to 
unemployment benefit and implicit disadvantage in access through their over-representation in 
temporary contracts and their on average shorter tenure. Earnings or hours thresholds represent a 
direct criterion for excluding those who work shorter hours and the qualifying period (usually a 
minimum contribution period within a given reference period) can further restrict the access of young 
persons whose contracts are of short duration (for details and specific country examples see Leschke 
2012 and 2013 and Eurofound 2013). There are also rules affecting youth directly with both positive 
and negative implications on benefit coverage. In the following we give some concrete examples.    
 
Three countries explicitly restrict the eligibility to unemployment benefits for certain types of temporary 
workers: Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (for details see Eurofound, 2013). For example, in 
Slovakia, all temporary workers were excluded from unemployment benefits until January 2013. Now 
temporary workers above a certain earnings threshold qualify more easily than permanent workers (2 
years employment within a reference period of 4 instead of a reference period of 3 years for 
permanent workers) (Eurofound 2013).  
 
More generally speaking, it is easier for young people (and temporary workers) to access 
unemployment benefits in countries with short contribution periods within a long reference period 
(however, this says nothing about the generosity of the benefits received). According to Eurofound 
(2013), in practice it seems to be easiest for workers with short contract duration, and in particular 
temporary workers, to qualify for unemployment benefits in France, Spain, Greece, Malta and 
Finland. Qualifying conditions are likely to be most difficult to meet in the Netherlands, Ireland, Latvia, 
Poland and Bulgaria (for details refer to Eurofound (2013: 20 – 21).  
  
Age can also come into play in relation to access to benefits, an explicit factor that can negatively 
impact access by young people. For example in the UK, those under 18 years are not entitled to any 
form of benefit insurance, irrespective of what type of contract they have (European Commission, 
2011a). On the other hand, in some countries qualifying criteria for unemployment benefits can be 
more relaxed for youth or allow them to enter in other ways than the usual contribution period within a 
specific employment reference period. For example, in Finland, youth (17-25 years) wishing to assess 
unemployment insurance benefits can have either a vocational qualification, 5 months’ work history, 
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or 5 months’ participation in ALMPs. Romania allows graduates who are searching for work 
exemptions from a qualifying period for unemployment benefit (MISSOC, 2014).  
 
Young people can also be entitled to lower amounts, and shorter benefit duration. In Italy and Ireland, 
for example, younger workers’ benefit rates are lower than for older workers (European Commission, 
2011a). Several countries make benefit duration dependent on length of contribution payments (e.g. 
Austria, Bulgaria, Germany and the Netherlands) which disproportionally affects younger workers with 
lower employment tenure (MISSOC, 2013). 
 
4.2 Reforming unemployment benefits to better include youth 
This section looks at reforms in unemployment benefits during the first period of the crisis (2008-
2009). The focus during this time was predominantly – but not exclusively – on opening up access to 
unemployment benefits. It also takes account of the period 2010-2014, where in several cases 
unemployment benefits were the target of austerity measures. A number of benefit reforms were 
explicitly geared towards youth, usually comprising direct links to education and training programmes 
(see examples below). The majority of reforms, however, were of a more general nature, and related 
to relaxed qualifying conditions or increasing benefit levels, which indirectly impact on youth. Here, we 
review the changes to unemployment benefit systems in the EU27 with regard to qualifying criteria, 
benefit level, including one-off payments and duration.  For country examples of these reforms see 
the text below and Table 3. 
 
Stimulus period  
 
In the first part of the crisis (2008-2009) which was characterised in most countries by stimulus measures, 
qualifying criteria were relaxed in Finland, France, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Portugal and Latvia– the latter 
two countries previously had rather strict qualifying criteria – with positive impacts on employees with short 
tenure (for details see European Commission 2010b: 137; European Commission 2011a: 18 - 24). This 
happened either through reducing contribution periods, increasing reference periods (or both) or opening 
schemes explicitly to new groups of workers. Sweden, for example, temporarily lowered the membership 
condition (in an unemployment insurance fund) for income-related unemployment benefits from one year to 
six months and made it possible for students to join an unemployment insurance fund by way of abolishing 
the work requirement (European Commission 2011a). In Italy, from 2009 to 2011 ordinary unemployment 
allowance was extended to apprentices with at least 3 months’ tenure and a broad group of employees 
including fixed-term, temporary agency workers and apprentices were allowed to apply for exceptional 
unemployment benefits (European Commission 2011a). France made means-tested welfare benefits 
available to jobseekers between 18 and 25 years who were previously excluded. To prevent students from 
gaining access to this benefit a relatively strict qualifying condition of 2 years’ employment within 3 was 
added, taking into account all types of employment contracts (LABREF 2015). Several of the measures 
introduced in this time period were temporary.  
 
A number of countries and among them Greece, France, Spain and Italy granted temporary lump-sum or 
one-off payments to unemployed workers not eligible for regular unemployment benefits. In France these 
were directly targeted to youth who did not fulfil eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits (LABREF 
2015).  
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Unemployment benefit levels were increased in Belgium, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic 
and Poland as well as Latvia and Finland (European Commission 2011: 76-78).  An exception to this trend 
of improving the situation of groups with less coverage, Ireland substantially reduced the benefit level for 
young claimants (18-24 years) in 2009. However, these reduced benefit rates did not apply to those 
participating in training or education programmes (European Commission 2011b).   
 
Benefit duration in unemployment insurance or assistance was increased in Finland, Romania, Latvia and 
Lithuania, in the latter only in municipalities hit particularly hard by the crisis (European Commission 2011: 
76-78). Targeting benefit duration of persons already eligible for unemployment benefits, the Spanish 
government approved a temporary flat-rate unemployment assistance benefit payable for six months to all 
unemployed persons whose unemployment insurance benefit had ceased.3 A similar reform was carried 
through in Portugal. Inversely, Ireland, the Czech Republic, Poland, France and Denmark4  decreased the 
maximum duration of unemployment benefits. The Irish reform explicitly targeted young youth (<18 years) 
by reducing the duration of Job Benefit from 12 to 6 months for this age group (European Commission, 
2011a). 
 
Second-tier systems such as social assistance were improved in a number of countries, as evidenced by 
increases to housing support, for example. Some countries (e.g. Estonia) had already planned 
improvements to their unemployment benefits systems which then were not carried through or postponed 
due to the crisis. Only a few countries had already reduced benefits during this initial crisis period as a part 
of fiscal consolidation measures (see Ireland) - in most cases these reductions were geared towards 
benefit duration. 
 
Austerity Period  
As evident from Table 3 while, in the first part of the crisis, the focus was often on relaxing eligibility and 
increasing benefit levels, the austerity period was characterised by tightening eligibility and decreasing 
benefit levels. Particularly, reforms relating to eligibility, even when not explicitly geared towards youth, 
usually have a disproportionate effect on young unemployed given their shorter average tenure. However, 
during this period there were also a few countries which relaxed qualifying criteria often with a view to 
youth. These reforms usually stipulated a link between passive benefit entitlements and participation in 
education and training programmes (MISSOC, 2014; European Commission, 2014a).5 Below we give 
some details on a number of reforms targeting youth explicitly (marked with a star in the table). 
 
In Ireland benefit levels for those of 22 to 26 years were reduced further (a first reduction already took 
place in 2009). Higher rates apply if the jobseeker participates in education or training or has dependent 
children. Belgium and Denmark tightened qualifying criteria for youth: In 2012, Belgium increased the 
waiting period before benefit allowance is granted to 12 months for all recipients (previously 6, 9 and 12). It 
is now called “vocational development benefit” and requires proactive steps with regard to finding 
                                                
 
3 Unemployment assistance in Spain is usually restricted to specific labour market groups such as unemployed persons with 
family responsibilities and older workers. The special benefit introduced in January 2009 was removed in February 2011; it 
had covered about 700,000 unemployed people (Sanz de Miguel 2.3.2011).  
4 Denmark formerly had a comparatively long universal duration of unemployment insurance benefits of four years; in 2010 
this was reduced to two years. 
5 Labour market integration is for example promoted through one off benefits, special benefits for the young, and benefits for 
partial and temporary employment (for details refer to MISSOC, 2014). 
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employment. In Denmark, since 2013, young people under 30 years without education no longer receive 
social assistance.6 There is an equivalent student benefit if youth embark on education and those not ready 
for education will still receive social assistance if they participate in activation measures geared at inclusion 
in education. In Spain, Slovenia and Italy, on the other hand, qualifying criteria for youth were relaxed in this 
period – the benefits to be accrued are usually short-run and/or means-tested. In Spain, for example, a 
temporary programme was introduced in 2011 geared towards youth, long-term unemployed, and other 
vulnerable groups making a means-tested flat-rate unemployment subsidy of 6 months dependent on 
participation in individualized training actions (European Commission 2011a). In Slovenia, qualifying 
conditions were relaxed for all unemployed in 2011 and further relaxed for youth under 30 years in 2013 
(Eurofound 2013). In Italy, since 2013, young people on apprenticeships are eligible for regular 
unemployment benefits (ibid). The Czech reform was interesting, as it shortened the reference period for 
eligibility, making benefits more difficult to access, but at the same time opened up unemployment benefits 
to those students fulfilling the eligibility criteria (Eurofound 2011). Table 3 provides a summary overview of 
countries that modified their unemployment benefit schemes during the stimulus and austerity period.7 
Table 3: Initial typology of countries with modifications in unemployment benefit systems directly or 
indirectly targeted at youth during the first period of the crisis (2008-2009) and austerity (2010-2014) 
(Temporary) 
modifications of 
Direction of change 2008-2009 2010-2014 
Eligibility 
(qualifying 
conditions) 
Relaxed Finland, Latvia, Portugal, 
Sweden(*) , Italy* 
Portugal, Slovenia(*), 
Spain* 
 
Tightened   Czech Republic, 
Romania, Hungary, 
Greece, Denmark*1, 
Belgium* 
 Explicitly opened to 
new groups of 
workers  
Spain, Italy(*),France* Slovenia, Czech 
Republic*, Italy* 
Benefit level Increasing Belgium, Netherlands, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia 
Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Slovenia 
Lump-sum/One-off 
payment 
Greece, Italy, Spain, France*  Spain 
Decreasing Ireland(*) Greece, Spain, Ireland*, 
Romania, Latvia, 
Poland, Portugal 
Benefit duration Increasing  Finland, Romania, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Portugal, Spain 
Denmark 
Decreasing Ireland, Czech Republic, Poland, 
France, Denmark,  
Greece 
*Reform explicitly relating to youth. (*)Parts of the reform explicitly relating to youth. 
Note: Due to the complexity and variation in benefit systems some of the changes are difficult to classify.8 Also in some cases there 
are uncertainties in which year exactly the reforms became active.   
1 Refers to social assistance. Source: own depiction based on European Commission 2010d, 2011a, Eurofound 2013, MISSOC 
                                                
 
6 Given its level, Danish social assistance can be seen as a functional equivalent to unemployment benefits. 
7 In is important to note here that it is challenging to compile extremely comprehensive data on these. The difficulty lies in 
the frequent changes to policy, in the time limits enacted on some policies, and in the time that is needed to establish the 
impact of general policies on youth. Here, we draw on MISSOC and on LABREF as sources, and on all publications to our 
knowledge available on the topic at the time of writing. However our analysis represents a first effort at mapping this policy 
landscape and we believe that more work is needed to fully complete the analysis. 
8 2013, for example, the number of days for which unemployment benefit could be paid was capped. The maximum of 450 
days within a four year period could not be extended if one became unemployed again. This affects both benefit duration 
and general eligibility. We have therefore placed Greece in both lines.  
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2015, LABREF 2015, Leschke 2013. 
 
4.3 Income security - access to unemployment benefits for 
youth during the crisis 
The remainder of the section looks at access of youth versus adults to unemployment benefits during 
different stages of the economic crisis. Special extracts of the aggregate European Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) data are used and we show figures on persons registered at the public employment 
office and in receipt of unemployment benefit or assistance. We will exclusively look at short-term 
unemployed persons (1-2 months) here. 9  As the LFS information on persons in receipt of 
unemployment benefits has been identified as unreliable due to, among other things, underreporting 
and misreporting (Immervoll et al. 2004: 58-67)10 when we report country results we show relative 
distributions and changes over time in benefit coverage rather than absolute levels (for a similar 
strategy see OECD 2011). It is unlikely that reporting errors vary strongly between different age 
groups in the same country and over time. Table 4 uses ranges on benefit coverage with regard to 
the adult population (30-64 years) in order to put the following analysis into perspective.  
 
Table 4: Coverage with unemployment insurance or assistance benefits as share of all unemployed adults 
(30-64 years), 2013, EU27=44.7% 
 
<20 Italy, Malta, Romania 
 
<=20<35 Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia 
 
>=35<50 
Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Latvia, Portugal, Sweden, 
Slovenia, United Kingdom 
 
>=50<=65 France, Austria, Czech Republic, Spain 
 
>=65 Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Finland 
Source: Eurostat LFS, special extracts. 
Note: Duration of unemployment 1-2 months. Registered at PES and receiving benefits or assistance as % of all unemployed. 
 
As a first indication, Figure 4 highlights the difference in unemployment benefit coverage for the EU27 
by previous contract type, age, and over time using the main reason for having left the previous job as 
a proxy for a permanent or a temporary job prior to being unemployed. We calculate the coverage 
rate as those registered at the Public Employment Service (PES) and receiving benefits or assistance 
as percentage of all unemployed. Older youth (though only limited data is available) are doing better 
than younger youth and if they have been on a permanent contract prior to unemployment their 
coverage rate is in fact close to the adult coverage rate. Distinguishing now by previous contract type, 
temporary workers are in all age groups less likely than permanent employed to have access to 
unemployment benefits once they become unemployed. Previous temporary workers in the young 
youth group are least likely to have access. The differences across age can be due to both the explicit 
difference of youth in access to benefits or to variations across age groups in the distribution of 
                                                
 
9  This allows us to get around questions such as varying average duration of unemployment (different long-term 
unemployment rates) as well as differences in duration of unemployment insurance benefits and timing of set in of 
unemployment assistance benefits across countries.  
10 Differences in the wording of survey questions across countries plays a crucial role here and Immervoll et al. (2004) show 
for selected countries that the figures on unemployment receipt rates from administrative data sources and those from 
labour force surveys differ substantially with no clear direction in difference. 
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different types of temporary contracts. In line with the improvements in benefit design during the 
stimulus period, the situation of temporary workers seems to have improved somewhat in the first 
years of the crisis. Yet, the positive development stalled and indeed turned to the negative during 
austerity. This confirms our above findings that national and supra-national attention to disadvantages 
in benefit coverage of certain labour market groups were not sustained. 
 
Figure 4: Unemployment benefit receipt of short-term unemployed by previous contract type (temporary vs 
permanent*) and developments during the crisis (% of all unemployed), EU27 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS, special extracts. 
*Dismissed or made redundant is used as the “best” proxy for a permanent contract. 
Note: Duration of unemployment 1-2 months. Registered at PES and receiving benefits or assistance as % of all unemployed. 
Note: 2007 and 2009 EU27 values for age group 25-29 are deemed not reliable due to missing values in the German data among 
others.11  
 
Figure 5 shows for 2013 the benefit coverage of youth as a share of adults for all EU27 countries with 
complete data. With few exceptions (Romania, Lithuania and Estonia), in the majority of countries 
youth are considerably less likely to receive unemployment benefits than adults. On average the 
coverage is around 30% and 70% to that of adults for younger and older youth, respectively. 
Regarding young youth in Germany, the UK, Belgium and Austria, the coverage is about one half that 
of adults. The examples of the UK and Germany show that for youth coverage, universal basic-benefit 
schemes (as second-tier benefits) work relatively well. However, the benefits payable under these 
schemes are means-tested and relatively low. In all other countries with available information the 
share lies under 40% and in 8 countries under 20%. Among the countries with very low youth 
coverage the majority also have high temporary employment shares among youth – which points to a 
vicious relationship between flexibility and security. It is important to square these findings with youth 
unemployment rates; generosity of benefits; and other transition options, for example apprenticeship 
                                                
 
11 Germany (with a large weight in the EU27 average figures) probably due to small case numbers has missing values for 
this age group on all other categories but “registered at employment office and receiving benefits” which leads to an artificial 
benefit coverage rate of 100% for this age group in Germany.   
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or study places with compensation.  
 
Figure 5: Benefit coverage of youth (15-24 and 25-29) as share of adults (30-64) by country, 2013 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS, special extracts. 
Note: Complete or partial missing data for Ireland, the Netherlands, Malta, Bulgaria, Luxembourg and Latvia. 
*Date for Austria refers to 2012. 
Note: Duration of unemployment 1-2 months. Registered at PES and receiving benefits or assistance as % of all unemployed.
  
 
Figure 6 shows relative developments in benefit coverage over the crisis period for young youth using 
2007 as the basis. For ease of readability we only display data for 2009 (peak of the stimulus period) 
and the most recent available year, 2013. The majority of countries with available information saw an 
increase in unemployment benefit coverage of youth during the first part of the crisis, with most 
pronounced increases in Slovenia, Portugal, Denmark and Spain. Both improvements in eligibility to 
unemployment benefits systems, and importantly also changing characteristics 12  of newly 
unemployed during the crisis will have played a role here. When we compare 2007 pre-crisis data 
with 2013 austerity period data we see that for only a limited number of countries is this positive trend 
in coverage still visible. It is most pronounced in Italy (not included in the figure), Greece, and 
Denmark, countries which have medium to low relative coverage rates of youth as compared to adults 
(figure 5). Benefit coverage in 2013 was lower than in 2007 in Spain, Portugal and Cyprus, among 
others.   
 
  
                                                
 
12 Men were for example more affected by unemployment than women in the first part of the crisis and due to being more 
often in standard employment they are usually more likely to fulfil eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits. 
0	  
10	  
20	  
30	  
40	  
50	  
60	  
70	  
80	  
90	  
100	  
110	  
120	  
130	  
RO
	  
LT
	  
EE
	  
DE
	  
U
K	   BE
	  
AT
*	  
HU
	  
FR
	  
GR
	  
EU
-­‐2
7	   CZ
	  
FI
	  
PL
	  
IT
	  
DK
	  
SK
	   SI
	  
ES
	  
SE
	  
CY
	  
PT
	  
LU
	  
LV
	  
15-­‐24	   25-­‐29	  
The interface between numerical flexibility and income security for European youth during the economic crisis 21 
 
 
Figure 6: Development in benefit coverage for youth (15-24) by country over the crisis (stimulus and 
austerity period), 2007=100 
 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS, special extracts. 
Note: Complete or partial missing data for Ireland, the Netherlands, Malta, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia and 
Malta.  
Italy not shown due to graphical limits (exponential change from minimal level (0.3-3.7 in 2013). 
*Data for Austria refers to 2012. 
Note: Duration of unemployment 1-2 months. Registered at PES and receiving benefits or assistance as % of all unemployed. 
 
Table 5 summarises the findings of the above analysis also including information for older youth and adults. 
  
Table 5: Relative change in access to unemployment insurance and assistance benefits to 2007 in stimulus 
(2009) and austerity (2013) period 
Age 
group 
 Substantial decrease 
in access 
Substantial increase 
in access 
missing data EU27 
(rel) 
EU27 
(abs) 
15-24 2009 CY GR, SE, FR, SK, ES, 
DK, PT, SI, IT 
IE, NL, BG, 
EE, LT, LU, 
LV, MT 
99 -0.1 
2013 CY, PT, CZ, PL, ES, AT 
(2012), HU 
RO, DK, GR, IT 81 -3.3 
25-29 2009 GR PL, UK, PT, CY, ES, SI, 
IT, RO 
IE, NL, BG, 
EE, LT, LU, 
MT 
100 0.1 
2013 GR, SE, AT (2012) UK, PL, RO, SI, IT 
 
85 -5.4 
30-64 2009 LU IT, PT, BG, LV, ES, EE, 
LT, MT 
IE, NL 102 0.9 
2013 MT, RO UK, ES, IT 104 1.7 
Source: based on Eurostat LFS special extracts. 
Cut-off points for substantial decrease <75% of 2007 value and for substantial increase >125% of 2007 value. 
Note: Duration of unemployment 1-2 months. Registered at PES and receiving benefits or assistance as % of all unemployed. 
 
We want to make two final points here. First of all, our analysis shows that it is important not to limit 
the analysis to youth between 15 and 24 years and to not just merge the younger and older youth 
groups (25-29). Older youth according to our analysis are better off than younger youth in terms of 
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external – but not internal – numerical flexibility (however we are lacking detailed and age-specific 
information on compensation at short-time working though). They are also better off with regard to 
income security. At the same time both youth groups differ from adults in that they do worse on all 
three dimensions. Secondly, this analysis has emphasised how complex unemployment benefit 
schemes are; how much they vary both in terms of access and generosity as well as availability of 
secondary schemes across Europe; and that they are frequently adjusted (and not always in a 
strategic way as seems to have been the case during the first part of the economic crisis). In this 
regard, comparative analysis on the dimension of benefit access is difficult. Attempts to create 
“simple” indices on benefit coverage – as they exist for benefit generosity – have so far not been 
successful (see Alphametrix 2009). The data testifies to this complexity. Indeed, because the LFS, 
among other potential problems of comparability, does not allow a distinction between insurance and 
assistance benefits we put a question mark on the reliability of the information on benefit coverage 
rates in a cross-national perspective and therefore only used relative change within countries in our 
analysis. 
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5. Conclusions 
The above analysis highlighted trade-offs, vicious, and virtuous relationships in terms of combinations 
of flexibility and security, as well as changes over the course of the crisis. Our analysis illustrates that 
external numerical flexibility - temporary or short-term contracts - is very high among youth, 
particularly the group of young youth. The fact that temporary contracts are frequently involuntary 
indicates that they are beneficial mostly from an employers’ perspective to screen new employees. 
Nevertheless, they do allow youth to gain first hand labour market experience, albeit with limited job 
security. This situation could be termed a trade-off between flexibility and security. Youths’ over-
representation in temporary employment implies that their employment is fluctuating more than that of 
adults, thereby rendering them more prone to unemployment. The above analysis illustrated that 
youth are not only more prone to becoming unemployed, but are also less likely to have access to 
unemployment benefits. This is because their lacking, or shorter-term, labour market experience and 
the predominance of temporary contracts means that they have greater difficulty in fulfilling the 
eligibility conditions for access to unemployment benefits. This combination of higher contractual 
flexibility and unemployment and lower income security at unemployment can be termed a vicious 
relationship between flexibility and security. The initial crisis period with its stimulus measures 
witnessed an opening up of short-time working measures to new groups of workers and the new 
temporary introduction of such schemes in a large number of countries. These are a tool of internal 
numerical flexibility that allow the preservation of jobs, while at the same time often cushioning 
working time reductions to a certain degree and thereby granting some income security. According to 
the LFS data, short-time working was relatively common among young workers; in cases where 
reduced wages due to reduced working time are partly compensated, this can be seen as a virtuous 
relationship between flexibility and security – if they are not compensated it is rather a trade-off.  
  
In light of surging youth unemployment - and indeed a youth unemployment crisis - in a number of 
European countries the limited access of youth to unemployment benefit schemes in many countries 
came on the international and supranational agenda (e.g. OECD and European Commission focus), 
especially in the early period of the crisis. The previous focus on supply-side measures was no longer 
deemed very fruitful, given the lack of realistic possibilities to include large numbers of youth in 
employment again within a reasonable period. A number of European countries – particularly, but not 
exclusively, during the first crisis period – accordingly improved income security for youth. More 
generally, temporary workers also experienced improvements with regard to access and the 
generosity of unemployment benefits schemes. This was done through relaxing qualifying criteria; 
offering lump-sum or one off payments; and increasing the benefit amounts or duration of benefits. 
However, already during the first period of the crisis (here defined 2008-2009), the reforms in terms of 
unemployment benefits were not only towards greater generosity. While no countries have restricted 
access to benefits during the stimulus period and only Ireland cut benefit levels, a sizable number had 
already reduced the duration of benefits before the austerity period. In the second crisis period (2010-
2014) eligibility has been tightened and benefit levels have been reduced in a sizable number of 
countries. In a few countries there was still a focus on improving the income security of youth, though 
usually conditional on participation in education or training. These developments have been 
summarised in Table 3.  
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Using the LFS data on access to unemployment benefits and notwithstanding the limitations of this 
data (especially compositional effects besides changes in access due to changing eligibility), our 
analysis reveals, in line with the institutional changes, an improved situation in coverage for both 
groups of youth and adults in the first period of the crisis (for details see table 5). When we use the 
latest available data, which takes into account the austerity period, we see that on European average 
both younger and older youth are worse off than before the crisis. This is not the case for adults. 
Accordingly, we can see that the benefit coverage of youth, which is considerably lower than that of 
adults, has decreased further in a number of countries. 
 
Reliable unemployment benefits of a certain generosity and duration render it possible to search for 
an adequate job. Income security at transitions thus can facilitate a better match between education 
and occupation instead of forcing unemployed youth to take the first best option - potentially informal 
or casual labour. Unemployment benefits can also have wider societal effects as they put youth in a 
situation of independence from their families where they can consider family formation. A crucial 
question here, not addressed in this paper, is if there are functional equivalents such as possibilities 
for further training or education at times of transitions. When looking at the interface of flexibility and 
security in a comparative perspective, it is important to consider the context. A point in case here are 
countries such as Spain, Portugal, Cyprus and Slovakia which combine very high youth 
unemployment rates (labour market flexibility) with very low relative benefit coverage rates (income 
security). On the other hand, the low benefit coverage rate for young youth in Denmark has to be 
seen in light of a relatively small youth unemployment population; a high focus on obligatory activation 
as part of the unemployment benefit schemes; a generous education allowance as well as 
comparatively generous social assistance which can act as functional equivalents. A positive 
development in this context is the EU coordinated and supported action on the implementation of a 
youth guarantee across Europe, which strives to offer education, training or employment to youth at 
an early stage of their unemployment or inactivity. Whether this new tool will be successful, 
particularly in countries with high youth unemployment rates, remain to be seen. 
 
Our analysis of the interface between internal and external numerical flexibility and income security 
shows a complex picture. Our paper identifies trade-offs, virtuous and vicious relationships at the 
interface of external and internal numerical flexibility and income security. While virtuous relationships 
were strengthened for youth and other, in terms of security, disadvantaged labour market groups in 
the first part of the crisis, the more recent trends point to trade-offs and vicious relationships again for 
the most part. 
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